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Abstract
A new technology is a bold new combination of production factors that
potentially yields a higher level of total factor productivity. The optimal
combination of input factors is unknown when an innovation is pursued.
A larger targeted innovation may require a greater change in the opti-
mal combination of production factors employed and increases volatility
alongside with economic growth. We show that economic policy can in-
terfere in this relationship with by adjusting source based capital income
taxes.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Cycles, Innovation, Capital Taxation,
Tax Coordination, Automatic Stabilizers
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1 Introduction
An innovation is the active pursuit of entrepreneurs out of a profit motive to
find a new and more productive technology. This new technology may require
a different combination of inputs in production. The uncertain change in the
optimal combination of production factors generates a cost for firms, if they
are required to write employment contracts one period in advance. If firms
set an optimal combination of production factors different from the optimal
combination of production factors, output will fall below its potential level.
This will result in lower revenues, which can be interpreted as volatility costs.
Both economic growth and volatility are thus produced endogenously by firms
decisions, and, in contrast to traditional theories of economic growth and the
business cycle, can therefore be instrumentalized by economic policy.
The driving force for growth is innovation and technical progress. In this
respect, it does not differ from existing theories of economic growth. (for a
survey, see Aghion and Howitt (1998)). In contrast to existing theories of eco-
nomic growth, this paper differs in identifying a different boundary to economic
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growth. Previous models of economic growth have focused on accumulation
(Solow (1956), Harrod (1948), Domar (1946), Rebelo (1991), Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988), Barro (1990)) and on resource constraints (Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)). In the prior, growth
was bound as (capital) accumulation could only be finite. In the latter, growth
was bound by the amount of workers available in the innovation process. In-
deed, the dependence of growth on resources led to the Jones critique (Jones
(1995)), which essentially states that current growth rates are unsustainable,
as they have required an ever increasing number of workers in research and
development (R & D). Here, by contrast, growth will be constrained by the
amount of risk entrepreneurs are willing to accept. As the cost associated with
innovation risks increases exponentially, there appears a natural boundary to
economic growth that is not related to the amount of resources devoted to the
growth process.
Despite the novelty of the approach, the paper is related to several strands
of literature. Technological change as a source of economic growth has been
addressed early on in growth theory. The rate of technical progress is the only
source of long-run growth in per capita GDP in the Solow model (Solow (1956)).
Still, technical progress only affected total factor productivity (TFP), but held
the optimal factor input combination for given prices constant. Harrod (1953)
suggested that technical progress is embodied entirely in the factor labor as
the only possibility consistent with the facts. Thus the ”great ratio” of capital
to efficiency units of labor remains constant along the balanced growth path.
However, labor augmenting technical progress leads to a permanently growing
wage, and hence a constant but foreseeable shift in the optimal factor input
combination away from labor and toward capital.
The first wave of endogenous growth models, which all have in common
constant returns to scale with respect to reproducible factors of production,
retain the ”great ratio” properties of factor shares (Rebelo (1991), Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988)). In principle, one could introduce a cost of adjustment to a higher
level of production. If these costs are exponential and significant, the economy
may grow at a permanently lower growth path, or the growth rate may increase
or decrease over time, in accordance with the specific properties of adjustment
costs. Under a balanced growth path, the factor shares will remain constant
even under these assumptions. In some respect, these adjustment costs mimic
the costs of employing a suboptimal factor mix, as proposed here. However, no
model of adjustment cost would be able to generate a cyclical behavior of the
economy.
Technical change that favors one factor of production over another was
later introduced under the heading of skill-biased technical change (Sanders and
Ter Weel (2000)), in order to explain the growing wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers (Katz and Murphy 1992). Of the several hypotheses brought
forward in the debate, the one closest related to this paper simply claimed that
technical change somehow favored one factor over another (Acemoglu (1998)).
This paper, too, allows for change in relative wages between two groups of work-
ers. However, here the movement of relative wages need not be unidirectional
and certainly will not be predictable.
None of the above papers have been able to draw the attention to the com-
mon determinants of economic growth and economic cycles. However, there is a
number of empirical papers suggesting a relationship between economic growth
2
and cycles. Campbell and Mankiw (1987) were amongst the first to report
permanent effects on the level of GDP from shocks to output growth, first for
the US and later on for a selected sample of various countries (Campbell and
Mankiw (1989)). Hall (1988) and Burnside et al. (1993) show that the Solow
residual is correlated economic variables, and can therefore not be purely exoge-
nous, as suggested by the real business cycle literature, suggesting that trend
and fluctuation of output should be investigated jointly.
Several authors have attempted to model the joint determination of growth
and cycles. A noteworthy first attempt was by King and Rebelo (1988). They ar-
gue that the business cycle indeed affects augmented factor productivity through
the quality of capital and labor, capacity, energy and natural resources, foreign
trade and structural effects. Nested within real business cycle theory, tempo-
rary stochastic shocks only cause temporary deviations from potential output.
Given on average positive productivity gains, trend growth itself is stochastic
but remains exogenous. While the fluctuations around average movements in
productivity can be interpreted as the business cycle, movements in trend itself
remain unexplained within the theory of real business cycles.
As business cycle shocks are exogenous, policy can only make things worth.
In the model presented below, where both growth and volatility are determined
endogenously by the choice of economic actors, policy will be influential. We
will illustrate this with an important special case. Using a model of a small
open economy, we can show source based capital income taxation can alter the
trade-off between economic growth and volatility. An increase in capital income
taxation will reduce the economies proneness to volatility and stabilize the econ-
omy, albeit on a slower growth path. Capital income taxation therefore plays a
role in this model, inducing stability. This is in stark contrast to conventional
models of capital taxation, where one typically finds that with fully mobile cap-
ital, taxing capital will be inferior to taxing immobile labor (Sinn (2003)). This
paper thus suggest a role for capital income taxation, the stability motive, and
prescribes it the role of an automatic stabilizer.
There are several recent papers that try to model both growth and cycles
endogenously. Matsuyama (1999) and Waelde (1999) argue that changes in pro-
ductivity happen only sporadically, either because there is a stochastic element
of failure intrinsic in innovation, or because firms prefer to invest in capital
accumulation after periods of high productivity growth. Within an elaborate
endogenous growth model, Aghion et al. (2005) investigate the effect of exoge-
nous shocks on growth and volatility. The interesting feature is that policy
choices (in their case concerning credit market regulation) may work on the
trade-off between economic growth and fluctuations. Comin and Mulani (2006)
present an innovation model, with firm specific and general innovations. The
prior lead to volatility, the latter to economic growth. Here, too, the growth and
volatility are endogenous, and the trade-off depends primarily on market struc-
ture. Closest to this proposal is a recent paper by Jovanovich (2006). There the
choice of a growth rate leads to a positively correlated stochastic cost. However,
Jovanovich fails to motivate the source of the stochastic cost.
3
2 The Model
We will analyze the relationship between economic growth and volatility in a
partial equilibrium1 model of a small open economy2, where capital is fully
mobile internationally with a world market prize of ρ, whereas labor is fully
immobile and comes at fixed supply L = 1. Aggregate output is assembled by
homogeneous inputs from n firms3, with productivity of the assembly equal to
At,
Yt = At
n∑
i=1
yi,t (1)
Each firm in the economy strives to gain a competitive advantage over others
by implementing new technologies and rendering the factor labor more efficient.
This will yield a productivity gain of ai,t > 1, which will last for one period4.
There are no direct costs associated with this productivity gain. However, firms
will face uncertainty over the optimal factor input combination, which is increas-
ing in the size of the productivity gain5. These individual productivity gains
will generate non-appropriable public knowledge6, that is used in the assembly
of the output good (1), so that the average of all ai,t will be the rate of technical
progress in the economy,
At =
At−1
n
n∑
i=1
ai,t (2)
An new technology will only have a transitory effect for the single firm, but
will have a permanent effect on the economy on the whole. We can think of any
successful innovation, or implementation of a new technology, as being copied
with a one period lag by all other firms in the economy. Firm specific techno-
logical knowledge thus turns into general knowledge, with the added advantage
that the uncertainty about the optimal factor input combination will vanish,
too. This is in stark contrast to the innovation literature, where patent pro-
tection for innovation lasts forever (Grossman and Helpman (1991)) or at least
until a new innovation comes around (Aghion and Howitt (1992)), but coincides
with actual patenting practice and open source innovations. Clearly it applies
more to process innovations than to product innovations7.
Aggregate economic growth will therefore be driven by two sources, disem-
bodied technical progress (2) and output growth of individual firms (3). As
the prior will have no impact on volatility, all cyclical components will derive
from the later term. This is in accordance with Comin and Mulani (2006), who
postulate that firm specific knowledge predominantly drives volatility, whereas
1It should not be very difficult to extend the model to a full equilibrium model.
2Wildasin (1995) shows that this assumption is not fully innocent, as a shift from a closed
to an open economy may shift risk from capital to labor.
3The number of firms n is exogenously given, but could well be determined by product
market regulations and national competition policy. We will analyze changes to the number
of firms in this light below.
4We can think of ai,t as efficiency gains. If the firm engages in productivity enhancing
activities, they will extract labor efficiency above unity, otherwise not.
5As shown below, this will induce firms to choose a finite level of productivity increases.
6This is a knowledge externality typical for endogenous growth models.
7For this reason, we have refrained from modeling differentiated products in the first place.
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general knowledge is responsible for economic growth. Firms8 produce output
with a constant elasticity of substitution technology,
yi,t = (1− φi,t)kσi,t + φi,tai,tlσi,t (3)
where ki,t and li,t are capital and labor, respectively. We assume that firms
must hire capital and labor at the beginning of the period, and before any shock
realizes9. Labor augmenting technical progress will therefore equal a1/σi,t . The
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is given by 1/(1 − σ). In
order to ensure substitutability between production factors, we must have σ < 1.
In this case, the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, with a
scale factor equal to σ. In order to ensure a positive marginal product for both
capital and labor, this requires 0 < σ < 1.
We will introduce the above mentioned uncertainty over the optimal factor
input combination by assuming that the parameter determining factor shares,
φi,t, changes with the size of the innovation. To simplify matters, we assume that
for a positive rate of innovation, φi,t has a bivariate distribution that depends
on the size of the technological innovation implemented by the firm,
φi,t =

φi,t−1 +
ai,t−1
ai,t
(1− φi,t−1) with probability p,
0 with probability 1− p,
φ˜i,t if ai,t = 1.
(4)
Several things are worth mentioning at this point. First, firms can choose
to innovate or remain with an ex-ante known factor share parameter φ˜i,t, to
be defined below (5). If they innovate, with probability p, firms are hit by
a ”positive” shock, i.e. the factor share parameter φi,t will be larger than
before, and with probability 1− p, firms are hit by a ”negative” shock, i.e. the
factor share parameter φi,t will be smaller than before10. We shall assume that
whether we are faced with a positive or a negative shock to φi,t is drawn once for
the entire economy, in order to exclude pooling of resources of groups of large
firms. If firms choose an infinite level of innovation, φi,t will go to unity with
probability p and to zero with probability 1− p. In that case, either the entire
amount of capital or the entire amount of labor employed will be completely
unproductive and therefore only costly for the firm. Note that if firms choose
no innovation, we set the ex-ante known factor share parameter equal to the
expected factor share parameter in case they would innovate, in order not to
influence the results. The one period ahead expected value of φi,t takes the form
φ˜i,t = Et−1[φi,t] =
p
ai,t
[φi,t−1 + ai,t − 1] (5)
It is noteworthy that Et−1[φi,t] = φi,t−1 if and only if φi,t−1 = (ai,t −
1)p/(ai,t − p). With ai,t set close to unity, φi,t−1 will converge to zero, whereas
an infinite rate of technical progress sets the equilibrium value of φi,t−1 to unity.
8We assume that the number of firms n is large, so that firms need not consider the choice
of others in their optimization problem.
9We will normalize the price of input goods to unity. This implies that the price of the
output good (1) will equal 1/At and falls with technical progress.
10The assumption that φi,t falls to zero is rather extreme, but adopted for matters of
simplicity only.
5
Otherwise, the factor share parameter will take a value somewhere between zero
and unity.
Firms will choose capital, labor, and the level of productivity in order to
maximize expected profits, taking market prizes for their product, capital and
wages as given. Firms will pay a source based tax on capital income equal to τ .
The first order condition with respect to labor states that the expected marginal
product of labor will be equal to the domestic wage,
σEt−1[φi,t]ai,tlσ−1i,t = wt (6)
In equilibrium, labor demand of all n firms must equal supply, which has
been normalized to unity. Labor demand is downward sloping, so the wage can
ensure equilibrium in the labor market. The firm’s decision to innovate will
influence wages. Substituting the expected value of the factor share parameter
φi,t from equation (5), we note that wages will increase with the size of the
productivity gain ai,t. The first order condition with respect to capital reads,
σEt−1[1− φi,t]kσ−1i,t = (1 + τ)ρ (7)
and holds that the marginal product of capital should equal the gross interest
rate (1 + τ)ρ. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the tax on capital (or the world
interest rate) will reduce the domestic demand for capital, given σ < 1. So
capital taxation will lead to capital flight, and it has been proven elsewhere
(Sinn 2003) that this has negative consequences both for the level and the
distribution of national income. As the change in the price of the domestic
capital stock will alter the optimal factor input combination, firms will wish to
alter the factor share parameter φi,t by changing the rate of innovation. And it
is this link which will ensure the role of capital income taxation on the trade-off
between growth and volatility in this economy. The optimal degree of technical
change is given by
Et−1[φi,t]
ai,t
[
ai,tl
σ
i,t + ai,tl
σ
i,t − kσi,t
]
= 0 (8)
where the elasticity of the factor share parameter with respect to changes in
productivity  is defined as
 =
∂Et−1[φi,t]
∂ai,t
ai,t
Et−1[φi,t]
=
1− φi,t−1
p(φi,t−1 + ai,t − 1)
There are three distinguished effects in the first order condition with respect
to technical progress (8). The first is the direct effect of technical progress on
labor productivity. The second and the third are indirect effects of technical
progress on labor and capital productivity, and it is always positive. The two
indirect effects have opposite signs. With the elasticity of the factor share
parameter with respect to changes in productivity  always positive, we find
that an increase in innovation will indirectly foster labor productivity and reduce
capital productivity.
Substituting the first (6) and second (7) first order conditions into the third
(6), we obtain a solution for the rate of technical progress ai,t, that depends on
a single firm specific variable. Given ai,t ≤ 1, and under fairly mild parameter
restrictions, we find that there is a unique solution for technical progress ai,t =
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at, and all firms will make the same choice of innovation. This implies that they
will all choose the same capital stock kt and the same number of employees,
Li,t = Lt, equal to 1/n due to labor market clearing. Substituting labor market
clearing and the second first order condition (7) into the third (6), we obtain an
implicit solution for the degree of technical progress11,
σnσ−1a−1/σt [at(1− p) + p(1− φt−1)]
(
1− p+ pat
1− φt−1
) 1−σ
σ
= (1 + τ)ρ (9)
This gives a unique and finite solution for technical progress at. Economic
growth is bounded not by capital accumulation or innovation costs, which have
been assumed to be zero. The capital stock will not grow without bound in this
economy. Following equation (7), it will reach its minimum of zero if Et−1[φt] =
1, and a maximum value of [(1+τ)ρ/σ]1/(σ−1) if Et−1[φt] = 0. The reason for
bounded economic growth in this model is the fact that infinite growth would
yield infinite costs due to a mismatch in the optimal factor input combination.
Firms will therefore prefer to induce finite technical change to avoid exuberant
costs.
3 Growth and Cycles
With a positive rate of technical progress at, the economy will exhibit volatility.
Individual firms contribute to aggregate output (1) through its production yt
and through its contribution to public knowledge at. We will therefore use the
measure atyt as a performance measure for the economy as a whole. In the case
of a positive shock to the factor share parameter φt, the aggregate output share
of a particular firm will equal
aty
+
t = (1− φt−1)kσt + (φt−1 + at − 1)atlσt (10)
where we can treat both capital and labor as given, as they have been chosen
before the shock has realized. By contrast, if the factor share parameter is hit
by a negative shock,
aty
−
t = k
σ
t (11)
The difference between those two states is a good measure of volatility in
the economy, and is equal to
at(y+t − y−t ) = (at − 1)atlσt + φt−1[atlσt − kσt ] (12)
It is important to note that volatility is monotonically increasing in the rate
of technical progress at. A higher rate of technical progress will therefore also
lead to a higher degree of volatility. Expected output is equal to
Et−1(yt) =
1
at
[(1− pφt)kσt + p(φt + at − 1)atlσt ] (13)
which is a weighted average between output under the current factor share
parameter φt and the expected long-run distribution parameter p, where a larger
11The solution is unique, as argued above.
7
rate of technical progress at puts less weight on the current value. Costs in this
economy are given by labor and capital costs
wtLt + (1 + τ)ρkt = σEt−1(yt) (14)
This allows us to determine profits in both states of the world,
pi+t =
1
at
[(1− φt−1 − σ + σpφt−1)kσt + (1− σp)(φt−1 + at − 1)atlσt ] (15)
which is a weighted average between profits in the absence of innovation and
profits due to innovation, where the latter can be negative. Similarly, profits in
the other state of the world equal
pi−t =
1
at
[(1− σ + σpφt−1)kσt − σp(φt−1 + at − 1)atlσt ] (16)
where the second part can once again be negative. Unless σ is very close
to unity, we can ensure positive profits in both states of the world. Expected
profits equal
Et−1(pit) =
1− σ
at
[(1− pφt−1)kσt + p(φt−1 + at − 1)atlσt ] (17)
By contrast, in case of no innovation, profits will be known in advance and
equal
p˜it = (1− σ)[(1− φ˜t)kσt + φ˜tlσt ] (18)
Substituting for φ˜t from equation (5), we find that the difference between
profits under no innovation and expected profits with innovation equals
p˜it − Et−1(pit) = −(1− σ)(at − 1)
[
p
at
kσt + p˜itatl
σ
t
]
< 0 (19)
This implies that expected profits will be higher than profits under certainty
without innovation, hence firms will always choose to innovate, and we can
exclude a solution at = 1. The economy will exhibit long-run growth. Economic
growth will be bounded, not by capital accumulation or costs of innovation, but
by the exponentially increasing cost generated by uncertainty of the optimal
factor input combination. Alongside with economic growth, the economy will
also exhibit volatility, which is do to the uncertainty over the optimal factor
input combination, too.
4 Government Policy
The implicit solution (9) allows for ample policy analysis. We will look at four
distinct policy experiments, an increase in the source based capital income tax
τ , capital income tax coordination, automatic stabilizers, and an increase in
product market liberalization, modeled through an increase in the number of
firms n. We will also look at other forms of taxation in order to see why this
model, as opposed to conventional theories, will give a role to source based
capital income taxation, even in a world with perfectly mobile capital.
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The first policy experiment that we introduce is an increase in the source
based capital income tax. Whilst we cannot take a derivative of technical
progress at with respect to the tax rate, we can do the opposite,
∂(1 + τ)
∂at
= −Ω
[
1 + 

[a(1− σ)(1− p) + p(1− φt−1)]
]
−Ω
[
[a(1− p) + p(1− φt−1)](1− σ) atp1− φt−1
]
< 0
(20)
where Ω is defined as,
Ω =
1
σρ
n1−σa−
1+σ
σ
t
(

1 + 
) 1
σ
As the derivative of the tax rate with respect to the size of the innovation
is negative throughout, we can infer the opposite as well. An increase in the
source based tax on capital income τ will reduce the rate of technical progress
in this economy. A capital income tax will therefore lead to lower growth and
higher stability. If policymakers fancy both economic growth and economic
stability, they are now faced with a dilemma. They can either increase the tax
on capital, and thereby increase stability at the cost of lower economic growth,
or vice-versa. Clearly, different policymakers, mimicking social preferences or
their own, may choose different points along the trade-off, resulting in different
tax rates across countries. Policymakers with a high preference for economic
stability will favor higher taxes.
As an increase in world interest rates would lead to the same result, these
policymakers would also favor efforts to coordinate capital income taxes at a
higher level internationally, which would in effect raise the global interest rate.
Whereas this policy would reduce government revenues, it would alter the distri-
bution of factor income toward labor income internationally.Capital income tax
coordination would therefore achieve both higher stability and redistribution at
the expense of lower economic growth.
Noting from equation 9 above, the effect of an increase in the number of firms
n is exactly opposite to an increase in capital income taxation. Countries may
therefore wish to introduce product market regulations for the very same reason
they introduce capital income taxes, in order to increase economic stability.
The automatic stabilizing effect obtained from capital income taxes cannot
be easily achieved through other forms of taxation. Labor taxes will only alter
the current wage rate, as labor is in constant supply, and change nothing in
the relationship between growth and volatility. Residence based capital income
taxes would tax worldwide capital income of domestic residents, and insofar as
the economy is small, this would not influence world interest rates and inno-
vation. Income taxes, which in this economy would be a combination of labor
taxes, source and residence based capital income taxes, would only influence
the trade-off through its effect on source based capital income taxes, but re-
quire a far larger amount of tax revenues to achieve the same effect. Finally,
consumption taxes would tax output consumed at home. Given undifferentiated
products, this would not influence domestic suppliers of products to the world
market, and therefore have no influence, either.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has established a link between economic growth and economic volatil-
ity. The idea was that a new technology is a new combination of production
factors that yields a higher level of total factor productivity. However, the opti-
mal combination of input factors is unknown when an innovation is pursued. A
larger targeted innovation requires a greater change in the optimal combination
of production factors employed and increases volatility alongside with economic
growth.
Economic growth is bounded by the costs associated with uncertainty over
the optimal factor combination. The further the economy will depart from the
anticipated optimal factor input combination, the higher will be these factor
costs. As these costs are increasing exponentially due to the convexity of the
production function, firms will pursue only finite changes in productivity, thus
inducing bounded economic growth.
We show that economic policy can interfere in this relationship by adjust-
ing source based capital income taxes. An increase in capital income taxes will
induce a slower targeted level of technical progress, but also lead to lower volatil-
ity. Capital income taxes can therefore be used to stabilize the economy, giving
a motive why small open economy may still wish to introduce them, despite
their negative allocative and distributive effects. No other form of taxation can
achieve this goal equally.
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